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ABSTRACT
Modern macroeconomics has evolved from focusing just on the dynamics of  aggregates, 
such as income, consumption and savings, to the dynamics of  the distributions that add 
up to those aggregates. This is a consequence of  theoretical contributions and increasing 
data availability and computational power. Though contributions regarding heterogeneity 
in macroeconomics can be traced back to the first half  of  the 20th century, it is only by 
the 2010s that we evolved towards a framework where there is a rich interaction between 
macroeconomic aggregates and their distributions that goes both ways. This special edition 
focused on contributions that build on such framework to study open questions regarding 
the impact of  fiscal shocks on output, the impact of  investment -specific technological change 
on inequality, optimal tax structures, and the impact of  the COVID -19 pandemic on the 
distribution of  earnings.
Keywords: Macroeconomics; heterogeneity; fiscal policy; optimal taxation; inequality; 
COVID -19 pandemic.
JEL Classification: E62; E21; E13; E17.
RESUMO
A macroeconomia moderna evoluiu do foco apenas na dinâmica dos agregados, como 
rendimento, consumo e poupança, para a dinâmica das distribuições que constituem esses 
agregados. Isto é consequência de contribuições teóricas e do aumento da disponibilidade 
de dados e do poder computacional. Embora as contribuições relativas à heterogeneidade na 
macroeconomia possam ser encontradas desde a primeira metade do século XX, foi apenas 
na década de 2010 que se evoluiu para um quadro onde há uma rica interação entre agre-
gados macroeconómicos e suas distribuições que se exprime nos dois sentidos. Esta edição 
especial é constituída por contribuições que se baseiam neste quadro conceptual e visam 
estudar questões em aberto sobre o impacto dos choques orçamentais sobre o produto, o 
impacto do progresso tecnológico dos bens de investimento na desigualdade, as estruturas 
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Modern macroeconomics has expanded its focus from the study of  aggregate variables 
such as income, consumption and wealth, to the dynamics of  distributions of  these vari-
ables (see Krueger et al. (2010)). Advances in computational methods and hardware and 
the greater availability of  microdata has provided researchers not only the means to build, 
solve and simulate models that account in greater detail for characteristics that differ across 
agents (be it households, firms or other), but also the data do discipline them.
Rather than a revolution, seldom observed in the field of  economics, the relevance of  
heterogeneous agent models has been growing in importance, in a slow but steady pace 
(see Cherrier (2018)). The most recent methodological contributions in macroeconomics 
have focused mainly on this, in particular on solution methods to heterogeneous agents new 
Keynesian (HANK) models.
The growth in importance of  this class of  models can only be partially justified by the 
greater availability of  microdata and more powerful computational methods and hardware. 
This only tells the supply side of  the story. There is also a demand side. First by the society 
at large. Macroeconomists have often been criticized by relying too much on the repre-
sentative agent framework, (see Chancellor, 2017, for example), even if  sometimes those 
critiques often depict the state of  the art in macroeconomics research 20 or even 30 years 
before, as in the given example. Second, by the profession in itself. Following the words of  
Deaton (2016), “While we often must focus on aggregates for macroeconomic policy, it is impossible to 
think coherently about national well ‑being while ignoring inequality and poverty, neither of  which is vis‑
ible in aggregate data”, some questions cannot be properly addressed in representative agent 
frameworks. But Deaton (2016) goes beyond that and also claims that “Indeed, and except in 
exceptional cases, macroeconomic aggregates themselves depend on distribution”.
This line of  research has come a long way. Early work by Kaldor (1955) and Pasinetti 
(1962) focused on the distributional implications of  economies with two types of  agents, 
capitalists and workers. In this framework, agents are ex ‑ante different, and as such, hetero-
geneity is exogenous. In a similar fashion, models where agents feature life -cycle behavior 
started to be explored. Following Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (1990), macroeconomic 
models where agents of  different ages coexist, owes its intellectual origins to the works of  
Irvin Fischer (see Fisher (1930)). This inspired the work by Maurice Allais (see Malinvaud 
(1987)) and Samuelson (1958)), with the latter often considered the seminal paper given 
its rigorous formulation and characterization of  an overlapping generations model. Later, 
Diamond (1965) introduced a neoclassical aggregate production function with two purposes, 
namely to examine the long -run competitive equilibrium in a growth model and then to 
explore the effects on this equilibrium, of  government debt. It is also in this paper that Dia-
mond shows that despite the absence of  all the usual sources that can lead to inefficiency, 
the competitive solution can be inefficient.
Despite the fact that age as a dimension of  micro -heterogeneity preceded incomplete 
markets in being explored in macroeconomic models, contemporaneously the term heteroge-
neous agents model is typically used to refer to models of  incomplete markets. These models 
feature uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and may include other sources of  market incompleteness 




is Bewley (1980) who revisits the permanent income hypothesis in a stochastic endowment 
economy and no state -contingent bonds through which agents could insure against their idi-
osyncratic risk. Imrohoroğlu (1989) disputes the results in the classical paper on welfare costs 
of  business cycles by Lucas (see Lucas (1987)) by studying an environment with indivisibilities 
and liquidity constraints. Huggett (1993) looks at precautionary behavior as an explanation 
of  why the risk free interest rate in representative agent models was higher than what was 
observed in the data. Later Aiyagari (1994) showed that the aggregate implications of  such 
channel are likely to be small. This paper was the first to provide a general equilibrium 
model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and borrowing constraints and remains the main 
reference for what is commonly referred to as the standard incomplete markets (SIM) model.
The next big methodological leap in the modeling of  incomplete markets came with 
Krusell and Smith (1998) who provide an algorithm to solve models that feature both 
uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate risk. In principle, the problem is infinitely 
dimensional, because the whole distribution of  wealth in the economy becomes a state 
variable, and this is an infinite dimension object. In practice, however, Krusell and Smith 
(1998) show that using only one moment of  the whole distribution – average wealth – sufficed 
to solve the model to a very high degree of  accuracy. Of  particular importance for some 
of  the discussion ahead, Krusell and Smith (1998) use heterogeneity in discount factors to 
generate an empirically plausible wealth distribution. A few years later, Castaneda, Diaz-
-Gimenez, and Rios -Rull (2003) use the SIM model to also account for income and wealth 
inequality in the U.S. without resorting to heterogeneity in discount factors, but instead 
by estimating, within the model, income processes that generate moments of  the observed 
distribution on wealth and income.
This first generation of  incomplete market models provided macroeconomists with the 
methodological tools to study the distributional impacts of  events at the macro level but the 
implications of  micro -heterogeneity for the macro aggregates were just not quantitatively 
relevant. First, as mentioned above, despite the point that Huggett (1993) made regarding 
the role of  precautionary behavior in response to uninsurable risk and its potential impli-
cations for the risk free rate, the macro impacts were found to be very small by Aiyagari 
(1994). Second, and most importantly, the results by Krusell and Smith (1998) – the fact 
that average capital, as opposed to the whole distribution of  capital was enough to solve for 
the model – seemed to suggest that the micro -heterogeneity simply was not that relevant 
for aggregate dynamics. In fact, Lucas (2003) went as far as to say that “For determining the 
behavior of  aggregates, they [Krusell and Smith (1998)] discovered, realistically modeled household 
heterogeneity just does not matter very much”.
One of  the key reasons why this generation of  models did not generate meaningful 
impacts from micro -heterogeneity into aggregate dynamics, had to deal with the fact that, 
though typically the models could account for the distribution of  wealth and income and 
even other dimensions, it failed in accounting for the distribution of  marginal propensities to 
consume (and to work), as Moll (2017) shows in the Figure 1 below, using data from Jappelli 
and Pistaferri (2014) on self - reported marginal propensities to consume.
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Figure 1: Marginal Propensities to consume in a standard Aiyagari (1994) model and data
So far, the use of  these models had been mostly to study the dynamics of  real variables 
and their respective distributions. One would have to wait until Oh and Reis (2012) for the 
first general equilibrium incomplete markets model with nominal rigidities. The paper focused 
on the fiscal response to the Great Recession that, the authors show, was predominantly 
through the increase in government transfers. With this environment, the authors show 
that targeted lump -sum transfers are expansionary both because of  a neoclassical wealth 
effect and because of  a Keynesian aggregate demand effect. The first model with nominal 
rigidities and both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk was featured in McKay and Reis (2016), 
who use it to study the role of  automatic stabilizers in the U.S. business cycle. This was, 
in effect, the first HANK model, despite the term being popularized only later by Kaplan, 
Moll, and Violante (2018). This new generation of  models was praised by policy makers 
(see Yellen (2016) and Constâncio (2017) for example) as they provided a much greater 
role for micro -heterogeneity to have an impact on aggregate variables than the previous 
one. A key feature for this was precisely an addition of  a number of  extensions (such as 
illiquid assets as in Kaplan and Violante (2014)) that improved the empirical plausibility of  
marginal propensities to consume in this class of  models and thus gave a much larger role 
to the micro -heterogeneity.
2. Model Features
In the series of  essays that make this special issue, the baseline model is the one I have 
used with my co -authors in a series of  papers, starting with Brinca et al. (2016), with some 
changes depending on the research question being asked. The main differences in the sub-
sequent papers can be found in alternative wage processes, as well as alterning production 
technologies. In this section, I will start outlying the general model features, commenting 
on the rationale behind each part, and introduce the different specifications the following 
papers use. The mechanism that served as motivation for Brinca et al. (2016) is not an 
original contribution in itself. The point we wanted to make was that, using an unrealistic 




government expenditures financed by a lumpsum tax, observable cross -country differences 
in the wealth distribution can lead to economically meaningful differences in fiscal multipli-
ers. Following Heathcote (2005), the Ricardian insight, revisited by Barro (1974), is that if  
capital markets are perfect, taxes are lump -sum and households dynastic, the timing of  taxes 
does not matter for households’ consumption decisions. Hence, in a dynastic representative 
agent framework, differences in wealth distributions would not, by assumption, produce any 
difference in terms of  fiscal multipliers, since Ricardian Equivalence would hold. However, 
we do know (as did Ricardo), that not only capital markets are not perfect, people also do 
live finite lives. So, if  out to study the role of  the wealth distribution in the response of  the 
economy to fiscal policy shocks, one needs to take these features into account, both meth-
odologically and for the sake of  empirical relevance, as the literature seems to agree that 
budget deficits have non -negligible effects on both consumption and interest rates. This is 
a key motivation behind Brinca et al. (2016). Not the mechanism in itself    the breaking of  
Ricardian Equivalence due to market incompleteness, something we know for a long time   
but its quantitative relevance, in particular in face of  other relevant dimensions along which 
different economies also differ, be it social security systems, tax structures, etc.
Demographics
The economy is populated by  overlapping generations of  finitely lived households. The 
choice of  an overlapping generations (OLG) structure is twofold. Recent work by Peterman 
and Sager (2016) makes the case for having a life -cycle dimension when studying the impacts 
of  government debt. All households start life at age 20 and enter retirement at age 65. Let j 
denote the household’s age. Retired households face an age -dependent probability of  dy-
ing, π(j) and die for certain at age 100.1 A model period is 1 year, so there are a total of  45 
model periods of  active work life. We assume that the size of  the population is fixed (there 
is no population growth). We normalize the size of  each new cohort to 1. Using ω(j)=1–π(j) 
to denote the age -dependent survival probability, by the law of  large numbers the mass of  





= -% . There 
are no annuity markets, so that a fraction of  households leave unintended bequests, which 
are redistributed in a lump -sum manner between the households that are currently alive. 
We use  to denote the per -household bequest. Retired households’ utility is increasing in the 
bequest they leave when they die. This helps us calibrate the asset holdings of  old households.
Preferences
The momentary utility function of  a household, U(c,n), depends on consumption and 
work hours, n  (0,1), and takes the following form:
1 This means that J = 81.
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where σ and η pin down the coefficient of  relative risk aversion and the Frisch elasticity, and 
χ scales the disutility of  hours worked which helps us to match the average hours worked 
in the economy. In order to make the age profile of  wealth empirically plausible, in Brinca, 
H. Ferreira, et al. (2019) we made it such households gain utility from the bequest they leave 
when they die, again scaled by φ:
D(k) = φlog(k)
Note also that we allow for agents to have different time preference parameters β. As 
it will be clear in the calibration section of  each of  the applications, the number of  differ-
ent time preference parameters will be chosen by the number of  moments in the wealth 
distribution that targeted.
Government
The government runs a balanced social security system where it taxes employees and the 
employer (the representative firm) at rates τss and xuss and pays benefits, Ψt, to retirees. The 
government also taxes consumption and labor and capital income to finance the expenditures 
on pure public consumption goods, Gt, which enter separably in the utility function, interest 
payments on the national debt, rBt, and a lump -sum redistribution, gt. We assume that there 
is some outstanding government debt and that government debt -to -output ratio, By = Bt/Yt, 
does not change over time in the stochastic steady state. Consumption and capital income 
are taxed at flat rates the τc and τk. To model the non -linear labor income tax, we use the 
functional form proposed in Benabou (2002) and recently used in Heathcote, Storesletten, 
and Violante (2017) and Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2017):
τl(y) = 1 – θ0y–θ1
where y denotes pre -tax (labor) income and τl(y) the average tax rate given a pre -tax in-
come of  y. The parameters θ0 and θ1 govern the level and the progressivity of  the tax code, 
respectively. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) argue that this function fits the 
U.S. data well.
In a steady state, the ratio of  government revenues to output will remain constant. Gt, gt, 
and Ψt must also remain proportional to output. Denoting the government’s revenues from 
labor, capital, and consumption taxes by Rt and the government’s revenues from social secu-
rity taxes by Rt


























The wage of  an individual depends on his/her own characteristics: age, j, permanent 
ability, a ~ N(0, a
2
v ), and idiosyncratic productivity shock, u, which follows an AR(1) process:
ut+1 = ρut + ϵt+1,       ϵ ~ N(0, 
2
vf )
These characteristics will dictate the number of  efficient units of  labor the household is 
endowed with. Individual wages will also depend on the wage per efficiency unit of  labor w. 
Thus, individual ’s wage is given by:
wi(j,a,u) = we
y1j+y2j2+y3j3+a+u
y1, y2 and y3 capture the age profile of  wages. The wage w is determined by the first order 
condition specified in the technology section below.
Technology
The following papers use two distinct production functions. On the following we will 
illustrate the two distinct environments and call them model 1 and model 2 respectively. 
The last paper in this collection uses a variation of  model 2, which will be explained in the 
respective paper, in detail.
Model 1
There is a representative firm, producing output with a Cobb -Douglas production function:
Yt(Kt,Lt) = K Lt t
1a a-
where  is the capital input and  the labor input in efficiency units. The evolution of  capital 
is given by:
Kt+1 = (1 – δ) Kt + lt
where  is gross investment and  the capital depreciation rate. Each period, the firm hires 
labor and capital to maximize its profits:
Πt = Yt – wtLt – (rt + δ)Kt.
In a competitive equilibrium, the factor prices will be equal to their marginal products 
given by:
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Consequently, the wage rate  in (7) will be determined by the first order condition (11).
Model 2
The second model differs from the one presented above in the production function 
employed. The economy still behaves in perfect competition, however a constant elastic-
ity of  substitution (CES) production function gathers the input capital (K), skilled ( Lt
S) and 
unskilled labor ( Lt
NS ) to produce the final output Yt. The factor Zt describes an intermediate 
good which can be produced using either capital and skilled labor. The final output then 
combines the composite Zt with unskilled labor to the final output as follows:
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At refers to the technology level, Ak,t refers to capital augmented technological level, 
ϕ1 describes the share of  the intermediate factor, ϕ2 the share of  capital within the inter-
mediate factor, whereas ρ is the elasticity of  substitution between capital and skilled labor 
and σ is the elasticity of  substitution between composite factors and unskilled labor. This 
nested production function is similar to (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013) and (Krusell 
et al. 2000) with capital and skilled labor acting as complements, whereas unskilled labor 
is a substitute with respect to the composite intermediate factor. As in the model 1, capital 
evolves according to the equation:
Kt+1 = (1 – δ) Kt + lt









































































In contrast to model 1, now there are two different wage rates. Depending on the indi-
vidual providing skilled or unskilled labor the wage  in equation (8) is substituted through 
the expression (17) and (18).
Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
At any given time a household is characterized by (k, β, a, u, j), where k is the household’s 
savings, β is the time discount factor that randomly takes up to four different lifetime val-
ues, a is permanent ability, u is the idiosyncratic productivity shock, and j is the age of  the 
household. In the case of  model 2, households furthermore are differentiated by their dif-
ferent skill level s ϵ {NS, S} refering to non -skilled labor, and skilled labor. We can formulate 
the household’s optimization problem over consumption, c, work hours, n, and future asset 
holdings, k', recursively as follows:
V(k, β, a, u, j) = max[U(c, n) + βEu'V(k', β, a, u, j + 1)]
 c,k',n
s.t.
c(1 + τc) + k' = (k + Γ)(1 + r(1 – τk)) + g + Y
L
( , , )
(
( , , )
)Y















n ϵ [0,1], k' ≥ –b, c > 0
Here, YL is the household’s labor income after social security taxes and labor income 
taxes. τss and xuss are the social -security contributions paid by the employee and by the em-
ployer, respectively. The problem of  a retired household, who has a probability π(j) of  dying 
and gains utility D(k') from leaving a bequest, is:
V(k, β, j) = max[U(c, n) + β(1 – π(j))V(k', β, j + 1)+ π(j))D(k')]
 c,k'
s.t.
c(1 + τc) + k' = (k + Γ)(1 + r(1 – τk)) + g + Ψ
k' ≥ 0, c > 0
For model 2 we can formulate the recursive problem once for the skilled and the non-
-skilled individuals, both facing their respective factor prices. Besides this, the recursive 
formulation illustrated above remains unchanged.
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Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Let the measure of  households with the corresponding characteristics be given by Φ(k, 
β, a, u, j). The stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by:
Given the factor prices and the initial conditions the consumers’ optimization problem 
is solved by the value function V(k, β, a, u, j) and the policy functions, c(k, β, a, u, j), k'(k, β, 
a, u, j), and n(k, β, a, u, j).
Markets clear:
( ( , , , , ))
K B kd
L n k a u j d











Whereas in model 2 there are two labor equilibrium conditions for skilled and non -skilled 
labor that need to be satisfied.

















in model 1 or in model 2:
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The government budget balances:
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The assets of  the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
( ) ( ( ))j d j kd1~ z ~ zC = -##
3. applIcatIons
In this section I describe the seven essays that follow as well as any departures from 
the baseline model that were needed. The first three focus on fiscal multipliers, namely the 
relationship between fiscal multipliers and labor tax progressivity; the relationship between 
the speed of  consolidation programs and welfare; and the importance of  asset liquidity for 
the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. In all three essays, the experiments are similar to 
the ones we did in Brinca et al. (2016), Brinca, Ferreira, et al. (2019) and Brinca, Faria -e-
-Castro, et al. (2019). The transmission mechanism hinges fundamentally on the aggregate 
response of  labor supply to the fiscal shock. Since credit constrained agents behave like 
hand -to -mouth agents, their labor supply elasticity w.r.t. to income shocks, present and/or 
future, is different from wealthier agents whose consumption and leisure behavior will respond 
directly to changes in permanent income. Hence, the share of  each type of  agents in the 
economy will be a key factor driving the magnitude of  the output response to the fiscal shock.
The second four applications are focused on the impacts of  investment -specific techno-
logical change on inequality, and optimal tax structures. In this case, the production struc-
ture of  the economy needs to be augmented to include different types of  capital and labor 
inputs and technological processes. In particular the inclusion of  technical change that will 
change the relative demand of  distinct labor inputs according to their different degrees of  
substitutability/complementarity with capital. This setup is inspired by our work in Brinca et 
al. (2019). Here, the key insight is that optimal tax structures depend crucially on the degree 
to which income inequality arises from differences in uninsurable shocks versus permanent 
differences between individuals from the start (see Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante 
(2017)), and that investment specific technological change, to the degree that the majority 
of  workers does not change the type of  occupation they perform during their life -course, 
has an impact on the permanent differences between individuals.
Pedro Brinca
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